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SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
The following is a summary of the proceedings of the Conference
on the Deep Seas and Continental Shelf. The statements included
here represent neither a verbatim transcript of the discussions, nor
a complete record of all comments made by the participants.Many
of the issues and problems which were discussed at the Conference
are treated in greater depth in the articlesand notes appearingin this
issue of the CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL.
Saturday, November 29th
THE STATE OF THE 1958 CONTINENTAL SHELF CONVENTION

PROFESSOR FREEMAN: Discussions on the Continental Shelf Convention frequently include reference to the views of Dr. Shigeru Oda
of Japan. Dr. Oda believes that the 1958 Convention shelf definition
would carry the coastal states' claims to mid-ocean if exploitable resources
can be found there. I would disagree; the majority of states reject this
view, as was illustrated by the United Nations discussions. The Convention notes "adjacency," meaning next to the shoreline, not an indefinite extension.
While most countries believe that areas beyond the shelf should be
used for peaceful purposes and recognize the 12-mile limit, problem areas
still exist. Does freedom of seas permit exploitation? What form will the
regime take? What rules will govern archipelagos and islands and what
different considerations should be given to fishing, minerals, and oil?
Also, whether and to what extent could the law of the continental shelf
be reversed? The present Convention definition of the shelf is 200 meters
depth and where exploitable. This sounds open-ended.
PROFESSOR OLIVER: Has there now been newly discovered evidence or mistake of fact regarding the 1958 Convention? For example,
the "have" nations have great continental shelves. Was this known in
1958? If not, this may be a good consideration upon which to open up
the Convention. Can the "rule of reason" be applied to the Convention?
Next, what regime is possible? The oil companies favor national
licensing over international licensing. State Department people prefer
an international regime. Why not a World Bank type of organization?
Yet, given the present trends at the U.N., there is now reluctance regarding international administration.
MR. LABASTIDA: Some 43 nations have now ratified the 1958 Convention and Professor Oda believes 30 more adhere to the principles
set forth in the Convention.
PROFESSOR METZGER: As far as developing new rules for a re-
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gime of the continental shelf is concerned, the issue has been foreclosed
to the 200 meter depth point by the 1958 Convention, which codified
the claims of coastal states made in the 1945-1958 period. Beyond the
200 meter point there is a much greater opportunity of developing new
rules.
MR. YOUNG: The oil industries are interested in the continental
shelf and slope, not in the deep ocean depths, at least as far as future
needs and development may be foreseen today. It is the mineral interests
which are primarily concerned with the deep seabed. There are manganese nodules and other exploitable minerals in these depths. I agree
with Professor Metzger that it would be impossible at this late date
to roll back the 200 meter claims of the coastal states to the continental
shelf. This is because of the codification achieved in the 1958 Convention and the International Court's decision' stating that the continental
shelf belongs to the coastal state as a natural prolongation of the territory of the coastal state.
I disagree with the point that the 200 meter point marks the furthest
extent of claims, for in some parts of the world, exploitation has already
gone beyond that point to greater depths.
AMBASSADOR EVENSON: (Commenting on the International
Court's decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf case) : I think that
this decision is not judicially outstanding, for in its important points its
language is vague and its meaning unclear. I have difficulty seeing the
continental shelf as based on principles of customary international law.
Similarly, it is difficult to see the claims based on conventional international law, for only about 40 states adhere to the Convention; it is conventional law only for them. The source of law for the continental
shelf principle was a ripening - a general acceptance of principles of
law to satisfy the need which arose following 1945.
I do not support a geological definition of continental shelf. International law can do better than that, but the present definition embodied
in the 1958 Convention is already antiquated.
In reaching agreement on the regime of the continental shelf political
interests must be considered; 50 miles distance is too narrow, 200 meters
is too shallow. Perhaps 500 meters and 200 miles is a good compromise.
PROFESSOR BRIGGS: The Convention itself, Article 13, provides
for revision after 5 years. Article 2 of the Convention gives exclusive
rights and jurisdiction for exploitation to the coastal state. This issue
is closed and is a fixed area of international law with no politically
feasible chance of change. With 70 states accepting the principle of
1. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep.; 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 340.
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coastal state jurisdiction over the shelf, denying it is just not feasible.
I think that any substituted criteria for limits, for example, 50 miles
or 200 meters, 200 miles or 500 meters, will be just as arbitrary as the
present system.
PROFESSOR OLIVER: If the 1958 rules were made in ignorance,
perhaps we should alter the rules. What is the present state of science?
PROFESSOR CRANCH: We have the technology today to explore the
deep oceans, but our ignorance of what is there makes exact prediction of its usefulness impossible. It is important to distinguish between
the two tests of exploitability: (1) technological ability and (2) economic
feasibility. There is no doubt that exploitation in both senses of the
term will greatly increase in the near future.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: Most of the states do not now look at
the 200 meter limit of their rights, but use the "exploitability" test
which they feel gives them greater national jurisdiction. If international
agreement or compromise is to be reached, we must seek a political
solution which appeals to the coastal states.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: Considering Oliver's question of the state
of knowledge in 1958, did we know what we were doing then?
PROFESSOR BRIGGS: There is no rebus sic stantibus question in
the issue as far as I can see. The most that may possibly be said is that
there was mutual mistake at the time permitting revision now.
PROFESSOR OLIVER: I will accept Professor Briggs' restatement.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: We were not ignorant geologically in
1958, but perhaps were ignorant politically.
MR. YOUNG: We knew the continental shelf areas in 1958, but the
changes as far as exploitability were concerned came much more rapidly
than expected.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: Did the less developed countries know
what they were giving up in 1958?
MR. LABASTIDA: As far as the Latin American states were concerned, they knew the geology in 1958. Their earlier Trujillo Resolution embodied the 200 meter and exploitability criteria.
PROFESSOR OLIVER: Was the degree of wealth foreseen? Even if
the geological configuration was known in 1958, if the extent of the
wealth was not then appreciated, perhaps the rich coastal states might
be regarded in some areas as trustees for all states in sharing some of
the wealth.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: The oil-rich areas were pretty well known
in 1958, but the mineral sites were not then known.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: Only recently have oil prospects been realized in the deep seas area. There is growing interest in the Arctic
areas now.
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PROFESSOR CRANCH: Since deep sea exploitability will greatly
increase in the coming years, it is urgent to work from the deep seas and
encroach the shelf areas. We should work toward the coast as much as
possible in order to share more with the less developed countries.
PROFESSOR METZGER: Cranch's idea is good. For the poorer countries to gain leverage in negotiating a regime for the deep seabed, they
should, as a tactical matter, reopen the continental shelf issue. It
seems to me that it is in their best interests to share the wealth of the
sea. Both the seabed and continental shelf issues should be joined.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: Malta made a proposal for the continental shelf issue to be reopened, but there was general opposition because the states were unwilling to compromise their shelf jurisdictions
not knowing in advance what international regime would govern the
seabed. Recognizing wide shelves may be politically wise and necessary
to get coastal states' acceptance of an international regime for the deep
seabed.
MR. YOUNG: Professor Metzger's idea of poor nations gaining leverage by threatening to reopen the continental shelf issue would probably not be possible because these states cannot get together as a bloc.
Their interests are so divergent that such a tactic is impractical. I think
that the present exploitation criteria takes us already to at least 400
meter depths. I agree with Dr. Evensen that there is no turning back
on the existing shelf claims.
PROFESSOR ESMAN: Is there exploitation presently beyond 200
miles? If not, this might be the best outer perimeter leaving three-fourths
of the Earth's waters to an international regime. Depth limit should not
be a criterion for coastal state jurisdiction.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: Norway does not support a perimeter
criterion but prefers a depth criterion. Two hundred miles will not be
acceptable to all states; some feel the current definition gives them
more. Australia, for example, has a shallow shelf extending far beyond
the 200 mile perimeter. But a 200 mile limit may bring peace if it is
advanced now. I suggested the 200 mile limit at the United Nations
and the developing countries seemed to express their approval of this
limit. The Soviet Union favors no international regime for the seabed. Freedom of the seas and seabed exploitation is their preference.
MR. YOUNG: The Soviet Siberian coastal shelf is very broad, so they
are satisfied with the existing law.
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Sunday, November 30th
ARCHIPELAGOS

PROFESSOR FREEMAN: There are interesting problems concerning
islands and archipelagos. (Evenson is an expert on the archipelago issues.) Indonesians regard their country as composed of both land and
water; semantically, it is such. The Philippines define the waters between the country's islands as internal waters and the islands as composing a geological unity. Micronesia resents the U.S. theory of the 3
mile territorial sea and the practice of granting permits for exploration and exploitation beyond that. Hawaii feels that the U.S. denied
the Hawaiians' birthright by not fighting for the archipelago theory
for Hawaii.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case 2
held that if the islands are an entity, then baselines may be drawn
around the outer perimeter of the island group for enclosing territorial waters. The Arctic states convention deals with both land and
"territorial waters." Coastal archipelagos are, however, more acceptable
than would be purely oceanic archipelagos such as Indonesia or Micronesia. There are problems of merchant lanes and innocent passage. Norway grants innocent passage through its coastal archipelago even though
the International Court (in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case) determined it was not necessary because the waters are internal.
Norway, Sweden, the U.K., Canada, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. are all
interested in the archipelago problems in the north. As to offshore archipelagos, Norway, the U.K., and Denmark agree Norway should fix its
continental shelf from its coastal archipelago. Norway's Spitsbergen
archipelago, however, poses difficult problems. Should the continental
shelf be measured from it? Norway is trying to reach agreement with
the U.S.S.R. Norway has asked oil companies to come in, but the
U.S.S.R. is not happy about that. It may object as it has to Sweden.
The U.S.S.R. is testing atomic weapons up there and fears electronic
spy stations.
It is easier to see adjoining archipelagos as part of a mainland; ocean
archipelagos pose different problems.
PROFESSOR METZGER: Isn't innocent passage guaranteed for
newly enclosed areas?
PROFESSOR BRIGGS: Norway is not a party to the Territorial Seas
Convention which includes that provision. Norway grants innocent passage between its skjaergaard, or rock rampart, and the mainland as a

2. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.
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matter of policy, but not because it feels an international law obligation.
Norway has ratified none of the four sea law conventions.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: Norway is not now a party to any of the
four conventions, but may ratify all with reservations.
PROFESSOR OLIVER: W"hat interests are involved for the archipelagos?
MR. YOUNG: The interests include the continental shelf, fishing
rights, and national unity.
MR. LABASTIDA: An international convention might declare established sea lanes to be international straits to preserve free and open
passage after recognition of the archipelagos.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: Perhaps continental shelf or at least deep
seabed resources benefits should be correlated to size of national populations rather than the size of national coasts.
PROFESSOR BRIGGS: You are talking about legislating against the
inequities of geography. Will nations listen to the archipelago group
now when they would not in 1958? The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are interested in the maximum utilization of the high seas.
PROFESSOR METZGER: In 1958 the U.S. Navy was the leading
advocate of the 3 mile view for territorial seas. Preserving the right of
innocent passage in straits between high seas is in the interest of the
U.S., as well as of many other nations -witness the Straits of Tiran.
Conventions are repealable. The U.S. may prefer to rely on customary
international law.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: These are turbulent times for customary
law and a convention might add to the security of open shipping through
the archipelagos.
MILITARY PROBLEMS

PROFESSOR FREEMAN: Let's turn to a consideration of the military problems involved in the shelf and seabed.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: I won't repeat what is in my paper, but
will just note that the U.S. has mobile underwater missile site technologyUnderwater mobile structures equipped with missiles could be put close
to the Russian coast to cut down to one third the time for delivery with
no hope of defense against them. The Russian proposal of March 19,
1969, would have banned "all military purposes," including monitoring
and detection devices on the ocean floor. The U.S. wanted to limit the
prohibition to fixed installations. The U.S.S.R. feared inspection and
the U.S. wanted to protect the Polaris. The October 7th draft of the
Peaceful Uses of Sea Bed Convention in Geneva prohibits in Article
1 the placing or implanting on or under the subsoil objects with nuclear
or mass destruction devices and facilities for launching or storing them.
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The Preamble declared that the provisions were not final or complete
and that more work would follow. This draft went to the First Committee at the U.N. The Convention would cover the entire seabed beyond a 12 mile limit.
PROFESSOR LONG: Land-based missiles are vulnerable and are
nearing obsolescence. Medium and short-range missiles would have better protection under water than in rocks. Major nations want to move
into the 12 mile seas.
DEAN FORRESTER: What is being accomplished if technology can
be adapted to achieve what the major states want despite the treaty?
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: It does stop the armaments race on the
ocean floor. It also prevents nations from moving up close to another
country's shore and using short-range devices.
PROFESSOR LONG: We should look ahead to the technology and
put a stop to the right to certain uses before the technology for them
is developed.
AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: The draft Convention is going before the
First Committee of the U.N. as a fait accompli. It was negotiated by the
large powers and given to the smaller states on a ratify or refuse basis.
Style and manner in such matters is important. All states should be
given a sense of participation, so it is best to negotiate in the U.N.
There is some sentiment to internationalize listening and tracking devices.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: International monitoring and detection
could lead easily to eventual international control.
MR. LABASTIDA: Some countries complain as to the language of
the Peaceful Uses Convention. The reference to "contiguous zone" was
intended to avoid direct mention of a 12 mile limit. Some Latin American states argue that such a reference would prejudice the extent of
their existent jurisdiction.
SEABED REGIME

PROFESSOR FREEMAN: The problems posed in establishing a seabed regime include access, controls, liability, and profit-sharing.
PROFESSOR METZGER: Through a government consultation program, national governments could do the licensing. They would give
notice of their intention to license to an international agency and the
international community. A "stop order" could be issued if anyone objected. Then the licensing nation and its company could work things
out with the objecting state. This way, a jurisprudential explanation
would not be necessary to solve the res nullius or res communis problem. The world community should share in the profits.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: Who would have the power to grant? And
the authority to withdraw?
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AMBASSADOR EVENSEN: There are three basic possible systems:
registry, concession, and international exploitation. 3 I am afraid Metzger's plan is too much like registry. This results in a scramble of countries trying to apply first, so you might have to restrict time, size, etc.
With enough of these provisions, registry ends up like licensing. Concessions by an international agency are preferable and necesary for order.
Although developing states want international operation, it would waste
time, money, etc., so I prefer the concessions system. Whether states
or companies themselves are licensed is a detail.

3. These three basic systems may be described as follows:
(1) An international registry agency for all of the seabed outside the 200 meter
geological definition of the Continental Shelf could be formed. The employment of
such an organization would clarify the sovereignty question by granting sovereignty
over the claimed portion of the seabed to any state by applying the traditional rule
of occupatio terrae nulliae. This proposal has been termed the "flag nation" approach
or the "snatch and squat" approach. Under this system the registry agency would
grant exclusive jurisdiction for appropriation of seabed territories and exploitation
of mineral resources of the seabed within them beyond the 200 meter mark to the
nation of the flag of the discovering expedition.
See generally - MiRA, THE MINEPAL REsouRc s OF THE SEA (1965) ; Christy, A Social
Scientist Writes on Economic Criteria for Rules Governing Exploitation of Deep Sea
Minerals, 2 INT'L LAWYER 224 (1968); Ely, American Policy Options in the Developient of Undersea Mineral Resources, 2 INT'L LAWYER 215 (1968; Goldie, The Contents
of Davy Jones Locker - A Proposed Regime for the Seabed and Subsoil, 22 RurERS
L. REv. 1 (1967); Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep Sea Floor, 62 Am. J. INT'L L.
641 (1968).
(2) The "concessions" system envisions an international leasing authority with
vested property rights to the seabed beyond Continental Shelf limits. The leasing
authority would control the mechanism by which a state may gain jurisdiction over the
exploration and exploitation of seabed resources. It could be created and managed
by the United Nations or a sub-agency thereof. The functioning principles of the
leasing authority would include free access and equal opportunity. It has been proposed that this international leasing organization would (1). control and administer
international marine resources, (2) hold ownership rights to the seabed and its resources, and (3) grant or lease these rights in accordance with the principles of economic efficiency. Such an agency should function with the independence and efficiency
of the World Bank and would distribute the returns from the seabed resource exploitation in the manner set forth by the United Nations General Assembly.
See Young, supra, at 649, n. 27. See also Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, (1961)
I U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (effective June 23, 1961>; Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, T.I.A.S. No.
6347 (effective Oct. 10, 1967). Mr. Young suggests not to push the analogy too far
because there are already existing interests in the ocean bottom.
(3) A system of international exploitation could be established pursuant to a
declaration by the General Assembly that the rights to seabed exploration and exploitation are in the international community and that these rights may be exercised only
by an international body. This third system may be distinguished from the second
for, instead of creating an international leasing authority, an international agency
would be set up with its own exclusive power to explore and exploit the seabed.
Policies with respect to the resources extracted, the profits accumulated, and the
scientific advances made, would be drawn up by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.- I. Shepard, ed.
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PROFESSOR METZGER: The less developed countries should share
in any benefits from resources outside a 12 mile limit. I think granting
concessions to divide up ocean floor territories would be a mistake.
The system I suggested is licensing and more; it is not merely a "registry" system.
PROFESSOR OLIVER: My proposal would include the following
points:
(1) no national or company property in underwater territories, as such,
(2) no weight given to contiguity of the applicant,
(3) a special licensing agency with national participation, like the IMF
or World Bank,
(4) allocation of exploitation rights by a system of competitive, weighted bidding,
(5) some mathematical phased division of profits, and
(6) the international licensing agency would be the trustee for the
U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and the International Development Agency (IDA).
MR. YOUNG: More than registry is needed; otherwise there would
be a rush to register. I am against an international exploitation scheme.
Where would the international body get the necessary funds? Capital is
not all that readily available. We want to encourage rapid exploitation,
so it should be made competitively attractive. My preference is to deal
with states or combinations of states.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: Should seabed exploitation be conducted
along the lines of public utilities? Should a flat fee be charged for the
rights given, a percentage of gross proceeds, royalties? How much profit
should be given - 10%? Should the international agency have the power
to hold back to regulate the world market? Could we get a fee to the
international agency even between 12 and 200 miles if that were adopted
as the continental shelf limit?
PROFESSOR CRANCH: We want to have exploration proceed rapidly. However, a strong international organization might be needed to
slow down too rapid an exploration. We might wish to distinguish between the authority to explore and the right to exploit.
PROFESSOR METZGER: There should be early and maximum exploration. There will be great tension between the developed and the
less developed states. My plan of tension resolution, I think, has merit.
An agency used to control production and hold back reserves must have
a representative, mediating board. (It is not like the IMF.)
PROFESSOR OLIVER: I am not pressing for a World Bank type
of arrangement or a one country, one vote set-up. Exploration should
be left in the hands of a completely technocratic agency, like the High
Commission of the Common Market. The agency has to be initiating and
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may require a "pusher" agency - perhaps GATT could be used - which
could regulate the market.
MR. YOUNG: The wealth in the ocean is potentially enormous,
but not necessarily readily available either in technological or economic
terms. Deep sea interest is more for minerals than for oil. I have heard
it said that the world's needs in manganese for a year could be taken
from a 9 by 12 mile area of the ocean floor. An area 100 by 110 miles
could meet the world's demand in nickel for a year. These may be
optimistic estimates, but although we know little for sure, we do know the
resources are very large.
MR. LABASTIDA: If the shelf goes to 200 miles, won't the states be
producing most of what wealth would come under a possible seabed
convention?
PROFESSOR FREEMAN and MR. YOUNG: Yes, except for nodules.
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: In return for a guarantee of coastal title
to 200 miles of shelf, could we get the nations to voluntarily make contributions to the U.N. for the benefit of the less developed countries?
PROFESSOR OLIVER: "Nyet."
PROFESSOR CRANCH: Should the ocean floor be kept open to scientific exploration without regulation?
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: How do you distinguish pure from applied
research? It's a difficult question.
MR. LABASTIDA: In this area too, the issue arises as to sharing with
the less developed countries. Would they be given reports, reports plus
analysis, or even samples?
PROFESSOR FREEMAN: I am afraid our time has run out. I think
it has been a very fruitful and useful working session. Thank you for
your participation. Perhaps we'll all get together at the larger conference in Malta in June.

